A genuine V2V market mechanism aiming for maximum revenue of each EV owner based on non-cooperative game model

Abstract

As the number of electric vehicles (EVs) surges, EVs are expected to supply auxiliary services for power grid through the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) operation. Specifically, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), as a beneficial supplement of V2G, has received increasing attention owing to the capability for flexible EVs deployment and profitable individual interaction. In this paper, a genuine V2V market mechanism aiming for maximum revenue of each EV owner is proposed to construct a distributed electricity market. It reveals the dominance of EV owners from the perspective of market and allows the trade among EV owners in local distribution grid with charging points such as charging stations and auto parks. To this end, the implementation of V2V market mechanism is analyzed in detail, including the electricity price, the process and the integration with the internet of smart charging points (ISCP), a cyber-physical architecture. Then, EVs’ energy dispatching is formulated via the non-cooperative game model, in which each EV owner anticipates maximizing individual revenue by choosing feasible strategies. The existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium (NE) in a non-cooperative game is proved by means of variation inequality (VI) theory. Finally, the ISCP-based optimal algorithm is developed to solve the NE efficiently, thereby maximizing reward of each EV owner. Comprehensive case studies show that the proposed V2V market mechanism can implement distributed dealing among EV owners with reducing individual charging cost and regional load variance effectively. Specially, the costs of EV1, EV8 and EV9 decrease by 31%, 36% and 34%, respectively. And V2V charging demonstrates much lower variance (10.5209) than regular charging (14.1124). Additionally, the convergence of the algorithm is also demonstrated, reaching the NE in less than 30 iterations for each EV.