A garantia institucional do Ministério Público em função da proteção dos direitos humanos

Abstract

This thesis offers a critical analysis of the institutional guarantee of independence of the Brazilian Public Attorney's Office regarding two aspects: on one hand, its independence concerning the organizational spheres of the classical branches of the State; on the other hand, the limits of the functional independence that aims at securing free development of the institutional functions to the members of the Public Attorney's Office. Due to the process of universal acknowledgement of human rights since the Declaration of 1948, the value of a human being's dignity represents the central basis of the Democratic Rule of Law of the 1 988 Federal Constitution, establishing a legal source for the vast set of fundamental rights contained in it. The protection of the fundamental rights of a human being is intrinsic to a democratic political system, which cannot dispense with an efficient procedure to control the use of political power for pursuing such desideratum. Hence the importance of the efficiency of the mechanisms of checks and balances among state agencies, in carrying out the fundamental principle proposed by Montesquieu that is no longer limited nowadays to the triple distribution formula of legislative, executive and judiciary functions. It's in this context that the present work intends to introduce the analysis of the institutional guarantee of independence of the Public Attorney's Office, specifically examining certain functions attributed to it for the control over decisions by other state agencies, particularly in the executive branch, that involve the safeguarding of the fundamental rights of protection of a human being's dignity. The hypothesis is the existence of organizational aspects stipulating the operation of the Public Attorney's Office in discordance with its full role as new political agent, such as: a) absence of precise limits to guarantee functional independence in the development of its activities; b) an autocratic ruling system guiding decisions on all institutional policies; c) maintenance of the bonds linking the institution to the executive branch, which is conceived as the hegemonic branch of Brazil's political system. This work intends to investigate the causes of those problems, correlate them and pinpoint mistakes, in order to identify the relevant points that would be subject to a swift alteration in terms of organization, so the republican, democratic values that ought to conduct a political regime as a Democratic Rule of Law may be reproduced in the operations of the Brazilian Public Attorney's Office.