유럽인권법원의 von Hannover v Germany (no. 2)와 (no. 3) 사건 속에서 나타난 사생활 보호와 공익의 조정

Abstract

Regarding the issue of the unity of the protection of fundamental rights in Europe, it is necessary to review the content of the European Court of Human Rights precedents on the conflict between the protection of privacy in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the freedom of expression in Article 10 of the European Court of Human Rights, as shown in the the European Court of Human Rights' rulings on Hannover v Germany in 2004 and no. 2 and no. 3. With regard to these rulings it needs to be reviewed first and foremost whether German courts have accepted its obligation to protect rights of the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Human Rights Court's specific judgment standards established through its judicial precedents. The legal review of whether or not the courts of the member states of the Convention accept the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in terms of fundamental rights dogmatic and fundamental rights theory is whether the scope of discretionary evaluation recognized by the courts of contracting state related to the guarantee of the European Convention on Human Rights is violated. The precedent of the European Court of Human Rights, which applies the public person doctrine only as a standard for legal interest balancing test to resolve cases of conflict of fundamental rights, cannot be cited as theoretical basis that public persons receive less or weaker protection of privacy rights than ordinary persons, or that there is legal basis for justifying discriminatory treatment for their privacy rights protection. Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, which does not apply public figure doctrine as a means to determine the scope of protection of the right to privacy of public persons, but only uses it as a quantifying weighing factor with other rights or public interests suggest that the right to privacy of public figures is not guaranteed in the form of an unlimited absolute right, but a provisional right (prima-facie- Recht). It means that the scope of protection of public figure’s privacy right as a fundamental right is determined in the process of balancing test between two coflicting fundamental rights, such as privacy rights and freedom of expression, or the public interest, which is in conflict with it.