Abstract
In a Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS), the interaction between the power cyber system and the power physical system becomes more extensive and more in-depth. The failure of a cyber component could have an impact on the security and reliability of the power physical system. Existing publications have focused on the impacts of the power cyber network on the power physical network, while a general CPPS model considering the mutual impacts of these two networks is less studied. Given this background, a game-theoretic approach for a cyber-physical power system vulnerability analysis is proposed. First, a CPPS interactive model framework is structured, consisting of five types of elements: P-nodes, PP-links, C-nodes, CC-links and CP-links. The interactions among these elements are considered. On this basis, the system cascading failure under potential attacks is analyzed, followed with an optimal load curtailment operation when in an emergency. To further illustrate the system vulnerability, a bi-level optimization model under a game-theoretic framework is presented to describe the interactions between a CPPS attacker and a system defender. Optimal resource allocation by the system defender for maintaining system reliability can be obtained by solving the problem. The feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed method are demonstrated by a revised version of the IEEE 14-bus power system.
Highlights
A power system is one of the most complicated and delicate engineering systems in the world.Its complexity increases even more as a number of advanced devices such as distributed generators, energy storage, and a massive amount of monitoring devices are integrated into the power system.The concept of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) was introduced to describe a next-generation engineered system covering functions of communication, computing, and control [1]
Based on the given literature review, this paper presents a vulnerability assessment procedure of a Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS) considering virtual cyber-physical links
FDIAs can be considered as a specific version of integrity attack, where an adversary could launch state estimation is considered, where the online power schedule signal from the remote estimator attacks to inject fake information into the measurement system of a CPPS, and eventually bypass the might be falsified by attackers
Summary
Keren Chen 1 , Fushuan Wen 2,3, *, Chung-Li Tseng 4 , Minghui Chen 5 , Zeng Yang 5 , Hongwei Zhao 5 and Huiyu Shang 5. Faculty of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Ton Duc Thang University, UNSW Business School, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia
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