Abstract
This paper proposes a game-theoretic model of the two-player best-choice problem with incomplete information. The players (experts) choose between objects by observing their quality in the form of two components forming a sequence of random variables (xi, yi), i = 1,..., n. By assumption, the first quality component xi is known to the players and the second one yi is hidden. A player accepts or declines an object based on the first quality component only. A player with the maximal sum of the components becomes the winner in the game. The optimal strategies are derived in the cases of independent and correlated quality components.
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