Abstract
This paper considers a best-choice game with incomplete information associated with the job search problem. Players (experts) observe a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables (xi, yi), i = 1. . ., n, which represent the quality of incoming objects. The first component is announced to the players and the other one is hidden. The players choose an object based on known information about it. The winner is the player having a higher sum of the quality components (total quality) than the opponent. And finally, the optimal strategies of the players are derived.
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