A game-theoretic approach for investigating the competition between energy producers under the energy resilience index: A case study of Iran

Abstract

Nowadays, resilience has increasingly attracted scientific attention and has become a controversial issue on the global agenda and sustainable development goals. Energy is one of the most pertinent fields of application of resilience, so we developed the energy resilience index and addressed its role in the competition between a traditional energy producer and a renewable energy producer by applying a game-theoretic approach. In addition to energy producers, the government is considered another energy supply agent. The decision variables for energy producers are the amount of production and, for the government, the amount of subsidy allocated to the renewable energy producer. The results illustrate that higher energy output is attained through renewable energy rather non-renewable energy under energy resilience and government support of energy supply. Consequently, the price of renewable energy is determined lower than the price of non-renewable energy. Moreover, the results extrapolated suggest that the recovery level during disruption is considered more important than the distance between the power plant and the customers in the profitability of the non-renewable energy producer. Finally, several managerial implications are presented for energy supply chain decision-makers.