Abstract
The article offers a re-evaluation of American reinforcement for the Eighth Army following the fall of Tobruk in June 1942, arguing that American arms and air power made a decisive, if largely unrecognized, contribution to the victory at El Alamein. Both British and American leaders, for their own reasons, glossed over the critical American component of this most quintessentially British victory, and historians have echoed this downplaying of American aid. The article sets these political and military events in the context of expanding American interest in the Middle East.
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