Abstract
Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is seen as dividing those who do and do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are ‘approximately true’. But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realist, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form.
Highlights
Rather than making a prediction for the future of the scientific realism debate, I would like to propose a substantial revision of the way that debate is presently conducted
The scientific realism debate is characterized as dividing those who do and those who do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are “approximately true.”
I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realists, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form
Summary
Many latter-day scientific realists have come to reject the Catastrophist realist’s exceptionalism concerning contemporary scientific theories, allowing instead that the future of science will be characterized by conceptual revolutions and theoretical transformations just as profound as those that characterize its past, and that many of even the most central and fundamental claims of contemporary theoretical orthodoxy will be overturned as scientific inquiry continues.
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