A Flawed Formula for Peacemaking and Continued Violence in Darfur

Abstract

This article seeks to contribute to understandings of peacemaking failure in Darfur, during the negotiations in Abuja from 2004-2006 that led to the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. It argues that a key factor in explaining peacemaking failure, was the reliance on a standard formula for peace negotiations used across the world. Peacemakers, in and around Abuja, worked by assuming the existence of a limited number of cohesive warring parties, enabling a comprehensive agreement and consensus between these groups, and ensuring that this result could be enshrined in a logical written document. The use of this formula, although seemingly logical, entrenched pathologies in the Abuja negotiations – exclusion of certain constituencies, the use of simplistic narratives to frame the conflict, coercive diplomacy, an overactive mediation – that in turn contributed to the continuation and even escalation of violent conflict in Darfur. The article concludes by suggesting potential pathways to decentering this dominant formula for conducting peace negotiations.