Abstract
This article investigates France's policy towards the Arab world and the Middle East at a critical juncture: the first oil crisis. Based on largely untapped archival records, it demonstrates that concerns over declining power spurred Georges Pompidou's government to Europeanise this policy, taking advantage of the anxieties unleashed by the Arab use of oil as a political weapon. It also sheds light on the intricate links between the transatlantic relationship, relations between the superpowers, the Middle East conflict and Franco-/Euro-Arab ties.
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