A Dynamic Model of Authoritarian Social Control

Abstract

Abstract Authoritarian regimes often use targeted social control - unequal application of the law to limit expressive freedom and enforce social conformity. At the same time, their methods appear less draconian than in the past. In this model, an authority structures punishments and rewards to compel adherence to its preferred norm. The authority’s commitment is time-limited and depends on imperfectly informative signals of a citizen’ s behavior. Given two citizens with the same observed behavior, the authority imposes harsher punishments on the poorer and/or ex ante dissident individual. Lighter punishments are imposed on the wealthier citizen to prevent “overcompliance.” Wealth inequality increases over time. Some citizens become prosperous “lackeys” while others become destitute from confiscation. In stable regimes with high state capacity, the authority reduces punishments and/or increases rewards to allow citizens to accumulate wealth, leading to social conformity and balanced growth in the long run. In unstable regimes with low capacity, the citizenry splits into groups of wealthy lackeys and destitute proles.