Abstract
Representing about 8% of the world’s oceans, marine protected areas (MPAs) are effective instruments for mitigating the damage that overfishing can do to ecological and economic systems. Yet, less than 2% of the ocean is proclaimed an exclusive no-take zone. Expecting their number and size to increase significantly in the coming years, meticulous implementation of MPAs is central to their success. Using a dynamic game model we explore the impact of designated no-take marine reserves on fish stock and on fishing strategies. Our findings suggest that optimality can be achieved in a context of a combination of three marine zones, i.e., an open access fishery, a marine protected area and a fish bank. Our methodology consists of considering an infinite time horizon discrete fishing game with a migratory species between the three regions. We analyze fishing strategies and characterize the model equilibria for different behaviors, the fully non-cooperative scheme, the social optimum and the cartel setting. Our analytical results are supported by the use of a numerical simulation that compares different scenarios, including the current state of the world in contrast to different sizes of MPAs and fish bank areas.
Published Version
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