A distinct lineage of influenza A virus from bats

Swine are susceptible to infection by both avian and human influenza viruses, and this feature is thought to contribute to novel reassortant influenza viruses. In this study, the influenza virus reassortment rate in swine and human cells was determined. Coinfection of swine cells with 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus (huH1N1) and an endemic swine H1N2 (A/swine/Illinois/02860/09) virus (swH1N2) resulted in a 23% reassortment rate that was independent of α2,3- or α2,6-sialic acid distribution on the cells. The reassortants had altered pathogenic phenotypes linked to introduction of the swine virus PA and neuraminidase (NA) into huH1N1. In mice, the huH1N1 PA and NA mediated increased MIP-2 expression early postinfection, resulting in substantial pulmonary neutrophilia with enhanced lung pathology and disease. The findings support the notion that swine are a mixing vessel for influenza virus reassortants independent of sialic acid distribution. These results show the potential for continued reassortment of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus with endemic swine viruses and for reassortants to have increased pathogenicity linked to the swine virus NA and PA genes which are associated with increased pulmonary neutrophil trafficking that is related to MIP-2 expression. Influenza A viruses can change rapidly via reassortment to create a novel virus, and reassortment can result in possible pandemics. Reassortments among subtypes from avian and human viruses led to the 1957 (H2N2 subtype) and 1968 (H3N2 subtype) human influenza pandemics. Recent analyses of circulating isolates have shown that multiple genes can be recombined from human, avian, and swine influenza viruses, leading to triple reassortants. Understanding the factors that can affect influenza A virus reassortment is needed for the establishment of disease intervention strategies that may reduce or preclude pandemics. The findings from this study show that swine cells provide a mixing vessel for influenza virus reassortment independent of differential sialic acid distribution. The findings also establish that circulating neuraminidase (NA) and PA genes could alter the pathogenic phenotype of the pandemic H1N1 virus, resulting in enhanced disease. The identification of such factors provides a framework for pandemic modeling and surveillance.

Avian Influenza Virus Infections in Humans

Cross-reactive Antibodies against Avian Influenza Virus A (H5N1)

Viral Tropism and the Pathogenesis of Influenza in the Mammalian Host

Influenza is a highly infectious, acute illness which has affected humans and animals since ancient times. Influenza viruses form the Orthomyxoviridae family and are grouped into types A, B, and C on the basis of the antigenic nature of the internal nucleocapsid or the matrix protein. Infl uenza A viruses infect a large variety of animal species, including humans, pigs, horses, sea mammals, and birds, occasionally producing devastating pandemics in humans, such as in 1918 when it has been estimated that between 50–100 million deaths occurred worldwide.There are two important viral surface glycoproteins, the haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). The HA binds to sialic acid receptors on the membrane of host cells and is the primary antigen against which a host’s antibody response is targeted. The NA cleaves the sialic acid bond attaching new viral particles to the cell membrane of host cells allowing their release. The NA is also the target of the neuraminidase inhibitor class of antiviral agents that include oseltamivir and zanamivir and newer agents such as peramivir. Both these glycoproteins are important antigens for inducing protective immunity in the host and therefore show the greatest variation.Influenza A viruses are classified into 16 antigenically distinct HA (H1–16) and 9 NA subtypes (N1–9). Although viruses of relatively few subtype combinations have been isolated from mammalian species, all subtypes, in most combinations, have been isolated from birds. Each virus possesses one HA and one NA subtype.Last century, the sudden emergence of antigenically different strains in humans, termed antigenic shift, occurred on three occasions, 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2) and 1968 (H3N2), resulting in pandemics. The frequent epidemics that occur between the pandemics are as a result of gradual antigenic change in the prevalent virus, termed antigenic drift. Epidemics throughout the world occur in the human population due to infection with influenza A viruses, such as H1N1 and H3N2 subtypes, or with influenza B virus. Phylogenetic studies have led to the suggestion that aquatic birds that show no signs of disease could be the source of many influenza A viruses in other species. The 1918 H1N1 pandemic strain is thought to have arisen as a result of spontaneous mutations within an avian H1N1 virus. However, most pandemic strains, such as the 1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2 and 2009 pandemic H1N1, are considered to have emerged by genetic re-assortment of the segmented RNA genome of the virus, with the avian and human influenza A viruses infecting the same host.Influenza viruses do not pass readily between humans and birds but transmission between humans and other animals has been demonstrated. This has led to the suggestion that the proposed reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses takes place in an intermediate animal with subsequent infection of the human population. Pigs have been considered the leading contender for the role of intermediary because they may serve as hosts for productive infections of both avian and human viruses, and there is good evidence that they have been involved in interspecies transmission of influenza viruses; particularly the spread of H1N1 viruses to humans. Apart from public health measures related to the rapid identification of cases and isolation. The main control measures for influenza virus infections in human populations involves immunization and antiviral prophylaxis or treatment.

Avian influenza viruses have adapted to human hosts, causing pandemics in humans. The key host-specific amino acid mutations required for an avian influenza virus to function in humans are unknown. Through multiple-sequence alignment and statistical testing of each aligned amino acid, we identified markers that discriminate human influenza viruses from avian influenza viruses. We applied strict thresholds to select only markers which are highly preserved in human influenza virus isolates over time. We found that a subset of these persistent host markers exist in all human pandemic influenza virus sequences from 1918, 1957, and 1968, while others are acquired as the virus becomes a seasonal influenza virus. We also show that human H5N1 influenza viruses are significantly more likely to contain the amino acid predominant in human strains for a few persistent host markers than avian H5N1 influenza viruses. This sporadic enrichment of amino acids present in human-hosted viruses may indicate that some H5N1 viruses have made modest adaptations to their new hosts in the recent past. The markers reported here should be useful in monitoring potential pandemic influenza viruses.

An Epidemiologically Significant Epitope of a 1998 Human Influenza Virus Neuraminidase Forms a Highly Hydrated Interface in the NA–Antibody Complex

Influenza A viruses are highly infectious respiratory pathogens that can infect many species. Birds are the reservoir for all known influenza A subtypes; and novel influenza viruses can emerge from birds and infect mammalian species including humans. Because swine are susceptible to infection with both avian and human influenza viruses, novel reassortant influenza viruses can be generated in this mammalian species by reassortment of influenza viral segments leading to the "mixing vessel" theory. There is no direct evidence that the reassortment events culminating in the 1918, 1957 or 1968 pandemic influenza viruses originated from pigs. Genetic reassortment among avian, human and/or swine influenza virus gene segments has occurred in pigs and some novel reassortant swine viruses have been transmitted to humans. Notably, novel reassortant H2N3 influenza viruses isolated from the US pigs, most likely infected with avian influenza viruses through surface water collected in ponds for cleaning barns and watering animals, had a similar genetic make-up to early isolates (1957) of the H2N2 human pandemic. These novel H2N3 swine viruses were able to cause disease in swine and mice and were infectious and highly transmissible in swine and ferrets without prior adaptation. The preceding example shows that pigs could transmit novel viruses from an avian reservoir to other mammalian species. Importantly, H2 viruses pose a substantial risk to humans because they have been absent from mammalian species since 1968 and people born after 1968 have little preexisting immunity to the H2 subtype. It is difficult to predict which virus will cause the next human pandemic and when that pandemic might begin. Importantly, the establishment and spread of a reassorted mammalian-adapted virus from pigs to humans could happen anywhere in the world. Therefore, both human and veterinary research needs to give more attention to potential cross-species transmission capacity of influenza A viruses.

Pandemic influenza, typically caused by the reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses, can result in severe or fatal infections in humans. Timely identification of potential pandemic viruses must be a priority in influenza virus surveillance. However, the range of host species responsible for the generation of novel pandemic influenza viruses remains unclear. In this study, we conducted serological surveys for avian and human influenza virus infections in farmed mink and determined the susceptibility of mink to prevailing avian and human virus subtypes. The results showed that farmed mink were commonly infected with human (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm) and avian (H7N9, H5N6, and H9N2) influenza A viruses. Correlational analysis indicated that transmission of human influenza viruses occurred from humans to mink, and that feed source was a probable route of avian influenza virus transmission to farmed mink. Animal experiments showed that mink were susceptible and permissive to circulating avian and human influenza viruses, and that human influenza viruses (H3N2 and H1N1/pdm), but not avian viruses, were capable of aerosol transmission among mink. These results indicate that farmed mink could be highly permissive “mixing vessels” for the reassortment of circulating human and avian influenza viruses. Therefore, to reduce the risk of emergence of novel pandemic viruses, feeding mink with raw poultry by-products should not be permitted, and epidemiological surveillance of influenza viruses in mink farms should be urgently implemented.

The threat of future influenza pandemics and their potential for rapid spread, morbidity, and mortality has led to the development of pandemic vaccines. We generated seven reassortant pandemic live attenuated influenza vaccines (pLAIVs) with the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes derived from animal influenza viruses on the backbone of the six internal protein gene segments of the temperature sensitive, cold-adapted (ca) A/Ann Arbor/60 (H2N2) virus (AA/60 ca) of the licensed seasonal LAIV. The pLAIV viruses were moderately to highly restricted in replication in seronegative adults; we sought to determine the biological basis for this restriction. Avian influenza viruses generally replicate at higher temperatures than human influenza viruses and, although they shared the same backbone, the pLAIV viruses had a lower shutoff temperature than seasonal LAIV viruses, suggesting that the HA and NA influence the degree of temperature sensitivity. The pH of HA activation of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses was greater than human and low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses, as reported by others. However, pLAIV viruses had a consistently higher pH of HA activation and reduced HA thermostability compared to the corresponding wild-type parental viruses. From studies with single-gene reassortant viruses bearing one gene segment from the AA/60 ca virus in recombinant H5N1 or pH1N1 viruses, we found that the lower HA thermal stability and increased pH of HA activation were associated with the AA/60 M gene. Together, the impaired HA acid and thermal stability and temperature sensitivity likely contributed to the restricted replication of the pLAIV viruses we observed in seronegative adults. There is increasing evidence that the HA stability of influenza viruses depends on the virus strain and host species and that HA stability can influence replication, virulence, and transmission of influenza A viruses in different species. We investigated the HA stability of pandemic live attenuated influenza vaccine (pLAIV) viruses and observed that the pLAIV viruses consistently had a less stable HA than the corresponding wild-type influenza viruses. The reduced HA stability and temperature sensitivity of the pLAIV viruses may account for their restricted replication in clinical trials.

BackgroundThroughout the history of human influenza pandemics, pigs have been considered the most likely "mixing vessel" for reassortment between human and avian influenza viruses (AIVs). However, the replication efficiencies of influenza viruses from various hosts, as well as the expression of sialic acid (Sia) receptor variants in the entire porcine respiratory tract have never been studied in detail. Therefore, we established porcine nasal, tracheal, bronchial and lung explants, which cover the entire porcine respiratory tract with maximal similarity to the in vivo situation. Subsequently, we assessed virus yields of three porcine, two human and six AIVs in these explants. Since our results on virus replication were in disagreement with the previously reported presence of putative avian virus receptors in the trachea, we additionally studied the distribution of sialic acid receptors by means of lectin histochemistry. Human (Siaα2-6Gal) and avian virus receptors (Siaα2-3Gal) were identified with Sambucus Nigra and Maackia amurensis lectins respectively.ResultsCompared to swine and human influenza viruses, replication of the AIVs was limited in all cultures but most strikingly in nasal and tracheal explants. Results of virus titrations were confirmed by quantification of infected cells using immunohistochemistry. By lectin histochemistry we found moderate to abundant expression of the human-like virus receptors in all explant systems but minimal binding of the lectins that identify avian-like receptors, especially in the nasal, tracheal and bronchial epithelium.ConclusionsThe species barrier that restricts the transmission of influenza viruses from one host to another remains preserved in our porcine respiratory explants. Therefore this system offers a valuable alternative to study virus and/or host properties required for adaptation or reassortment of influenza viruses. Our results indicate that, based on the expression of Sia receptors alone, the pig is unlikely to be a more appropriate mixing vessel for influenza viruses than humans. We conclude that too little is known on the exact mechanism and on predisposing factors for reassortment to assess the true role of the pig in the emergence of novel influenza viruses.

The accuracy of Influenza A (H1N1) “swine flu” laboratory testing: A systematic review of diagnostic test accuracy.

The accuracy of Influenza A (H1N1) “swine flu” laboratory testing: A systematic review of diagnostic test accuracy.

Genetic correlation between current circulating H1N1 swine and human influenza viruses

Human infections with avian influenza viruses are a serious public health concern. The neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors (NAIs) are the frontline anti-influenza drugs and are the major option for treatment of newly emerging influenza. Therefore, it is essential to identify the molecular markers of NAI resistance among specific NA subtypes of avian influenza viruses to help guide clinical management. NAI-resistant substitutions in NA subtypes other than N1 and N2 have been poorly studied. Here, we identified NA amino acid substitutions associated with NAI resistance among influenza viruses of N3, N7, and N9 subtypes which have been associated with zoonotic transmission. We applied random mutagenesis and generated recombinant influenza viruses carrying single or double NA substitution(s) with seven internal genes from A/Puerto Rico/8/1934 (H1N1) virus. In a fluorescence-based NA inhibition assay, we identified three categories of NA substitutions associated with reduced inhibition by NAIs (oseltamivir, zanamivir, and peramivir): (i) novel subtype-specific substitutions in or near the enzyme catalytic site (R152W, A246T, and D293N, N2 numbering), (ii) subtype-independent substitutions (E119G/V and/or D and R292K), and (iii) substitutions previously reported in other subtypes (Q136K, I222M, and E276D). Our data show that although some markers of resistance are present across NA subtypes, other subtype-specific markers can only be determined empirically. The number of humans infected with avian influenza viruses is increasing, raising concerns of the emergence of avian influenza viruses resistant to neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors (NAIs). Since most studies have focused on NAI-resistance in human influenza viruses, we investigated the molecular changes in NA that could confer NAI resistance in avian viruses grown in immortalized monolayer cells, especially those of the N3, N7, and N9 subtypes, which have caused human infections. We identified not only numerous NAI-resistant substitutions previously reported in other NA subtypes but also several novel changes conferring reduced susceptibility to NAIs, which are subtype specific. The findings indicate that some resistance markers are common across NA subtypes, but other markers need to be determined empirically for each subtype. The study also implies that antiviral surveillance monitoring could play a critical role in the clinical management of influenza virus infection and an essential component of pandemic preparedness.