Abstract
Does the so-called interpretive turn in legal theory have an ethical dimension? Based on this guiding question, for these reasons, this essay aims to reflect over the connections between normativity and interpretation. To do so, it proceeds as follows: briefly reconstructs the “Hermeneutic Turn” in contemporary Legal Theory, punctuating the interpretativism of Ronald Dworkin; exposes the recent ethical developments of Gadamer’s work; explores the consequences that an “hermeneutical ethics” could have for legal thinking; revisits the comparisons that Jürgen Habermas had made between juridical hermeneutics of the Gadamerian matrix and the Dworkinian interpretivism in Chapter 5 of Law and Democracy.
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