A cyber-resilient control approach for islanded microgrids under hybrid attacks

Abstract

Microgrids (MGs) are cyber–physical systems (CPSs) where electrical and communication systems are coupled by networked control systems. The secondary control functions of MGs via communications could confront various cyber-attacks from vulnerable components. This paper proposes a cyber-resilient control approach for islanded MG systems with distributed generators (DGs) and energy storage systems (ESSs), which are subject to hybrid false data injection (FDI) and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The proposed control is designed based on the adaptive method to compensate for the bounded FDI attacks on secondary controllers while tolerating certain DoS attacks on communication links. The stability of the error systems is proved by using the dwell time technique and the Lyapunov stability theory. The proposed control can maintain frequency restoration, fair power sharing, as well as energy balancing among DGs and ESSs under the hybrid cyber-attack. The proposed cyber-resilient control approach is realized in a 13-bus MG system with 3 ESSs and 3 DGs. Real-time test is conducted by using OPAL-RT simulator to validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach under successive, time-varying and hybrid FDI and DoS attacks scenarios.