A Cutoff in the Production of Fissile Material

Abstract

Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva is now considering a convention to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons. While the UN General Assembly has consistently supported resolutions calling for such a cutoff since 1978, the recent discussions are principally the result of a proposal by President Clinton on September 27, 1993, for a {open_quotes}multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of international safeguards.{close_quotes} ({open_quotes}International safeguards{close_quotes} refers to verification measures by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to assure that nuclear material is not being used for weapons or other explosive purposes.) Such a convention would allow states which already have stocks of unsafeguarded fissile material to maintain them outside of safeguards, but it would allow future production of fissile material only if the material is safeguarded. The authors examine five points in order to better define some poorly understood technical and political issues: (1) the proper scope of a cutoff convention; (2) weapons stockpiles and requirements in the affected states; (3) effective verification; (4) cost-benefit analysis; and (5) how to prevent competition with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 75 refs., 1 tab.