Perspectives on a Treaty Prohibiting the Production and Stockpiling of Weapon-Usable Nuclear Material

Abstract

Negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and other nuclear explosive devices, has been on the international agenda for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for decades. A fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), later known as a fissile material treaty (FMT), was originally conceived as a measure to prevent additional States developing nuclear weapons and to limit the stocks of fissile material for States already possessing nuclear weapons. Over time, nuclear-weapon States pushed for a treaty that would only prohibit future production, while several non-nuclear-weapon States favoured two parallel objectives—nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament—and the inclusion of existing stocks and also their elimination. In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution calling for the negotiation of a FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The CD took up the matter in 1994 and by March 1995, a compromise-negotiating mandate was cobbled together by Ambassador Gerald Shannon that envisaged negotiations on a treaty with the proviso that any delegation could raise any relevant matter during the negotiations. Until now States have not been able to coalesce around a common negotiating mandate. This chapter reviews the ups and downs of the efforts to discuss treaty related issues and provides a technical yet accessible discussion on issues of definitions of fissile and nuclear material; the scope of coverage of a treaty; verification models; institutional aspects; and negotiating approaches, and suggests a practical way for making progress on this overdue important non-proliferation and disarmament measure.