Abstract
Electoral competitiveness is a key explanatory construct across a broad swath of phenomena, finding application in diverse areas related to political incentives and behavior. Despite its frequent theoretical use, no valid measure of electoral competitiveness exists that applies across different electoral and party systems. We argue that one particular type of electoral competitiveness'electoral risk'can be estimated across institutional contexts and matters most for incumbent behavior. We propose, estimate, and make available a cross-nationally applicable measure for elections in 22 developed democracies between 1960 and 2011. Unlike extant alternatives, our measure captures vote volatility and is constructed at the party (not system) level, exogenous to most policy predictors, and congruent with the perceptions and incentives of policy-makers.
Highlights
Electoral competitiveness is simultaneously one of the most central and mismeasured constructs in the study of democratic politics
In a recent five-year period, approximately one in every second issue of the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science and Journal of Politics published an article related to electoral competitiveness
At lower and higher loss probabilities (LPRs) plurality parties should be less responsive to the electorate since modest changes in vote share are unlikely to cost or win them a seats plurality, respectively
Summary
A useful cross-national measure of electoral competitiveness should provide, above all, (a) conceptual clarity and (b) a unit of analysis matching the actors, i.e., no system- or country-level measure, (c) consideration for electoral volatility (not just, say, vote margins), (d) a direct connection to the loss of power, (e) an interval-level scale and, in order to support policy analysis, (f) congruence with the executive’s perspective on his or her political security. In our OECD sample (see below), prime ministers are from the largest party in 82% of the elections, and this figure rises considerably further when only the first governments formed after an election are considered.4,5 Retaining this post matters in all electoral and party systems because it entails agenda setting powers. Parties whose electoral support is based on districts won by large margins, for example, will enjoy a lower seats-votes elasticity, as a given swing in the vote will not translate into as large a swing in seats (Chen and Rodden, 2013) Together these factors determine the expected probability of an election outcome, as seen from the perspective of newly elected leaders contemplating the security of their position against future electoral swings. We limit our measure to developed democracies
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