A Critique of Value-Free Political Science

Abstract

In order to avoid the bias of political ideology, or to avoid what they see as unjustifiable, because unscientific and unphilosophic, value judgements, some students of politics advocate a value-free approach to their subject matter. Chapter 1 noted some of the theoretical support for the modern project of a value-free science of politics. The logical positivists, held responsible for the so-called death of political philosophy, argue that values are non-rational and non-scientific, and so incapable of being proved true or false. In their wake, linguistic analysts characterise normative political theory as ideological, and contrast it with empirical political science. The end-of-ideology theorists declare normative political thought redundant and hold political science adequate for the support of the good society. Behavioural political scientists seek to separate facts and values so as to avoid nonscientific bias and maintain the supposed objectivity of their discipline. Chapter 4 noted that Karl Popper, one of the contemporary philosophers of science who is most influential on political scientists, accepted the dualism of facts and values. Chapter 5 noted that even Peter Winch, who is so critical of attempts to model the social sciences on the methods of the natural sciences, advocated a value-free study of society.