The use of categories and methods of natural sciences in jurisprudence and political science

Abstract

The authors of the present article demonstrate the inaccuracy of the idea proposed by the Vienna Circle positivists that it is necessary to extend the terminology and methods of natural sciences to political and legal studies in order for these studies to produce truly scientific knowledge, which, as suggested by these positivists, should present a set of statements formalized through the usage of mathematics. The authors contend that this theoretical approach opposes natural sciences to jurisprudence and political science and therefore are incorrect. It is the authors’ stance that social sciences, including jurisprudence and political science, as well as other areas of scientific research, explore the nature. Thus, jurisprudence and political science belong to natural sciences. Accordingly, in every area of scientific research the qualities of its results are controlled by the specifics of the sphere of nature under examination. It is this sphere that dictates a choice of categories and methods employed for this examination. These categories and methods are determined by the aforesaid specifics and, as a result, are also specific. For example, this is true not only for mathematics and physics but also for jurisprudence and political science. It is worth noting that every area of research has its own, distinctive findings or scientific results produced by means of the unique system of notions and methods, utilized in the course of the research. Spheres of nature examined within separate areas of research overlap with each other. Consequently, a given area of research may adopt categories and methods of cognition that were initially devised within another area of research. However, such an adoption should be undertaken only if it leads to the achievement of original scientific results.