Abstract
Most observers of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political situation have focused only on the problems that the Dayton Peace Accord created for the normal functioning of this Southeastern European state, but a workable solution is yet to be proposed.
 The Accord achieved peace by blocking any ability for effective governing and by diminishing the Bosnian state capacity through an excessive dispersion of power with an uncommon constitutional focus on internationalism, and an erroneous type of pluralism that undermines the normal functioning of a democracy. The solution for these problems is to be found by adjusting the procedural selection of the United Nations High Representative, who is the primary actor directly responsible for the implementation of the Accord, both in terms of the letter and intent of the document, and this paper explains how that change can be made and what problems it will resolve.
Highlights
Among the many contradictions concerning the common understanding of the rules regarding states’ sovereignty, it is important to note that the precondition set by the international community and the United Nations for the recognition of Bosnia as an independent state was a state-wide referendum by the people of that Former Yugoslav Federal unit, which was conducted in 1992
Most observers of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political situation have focused only on the problems that the Dayton Peace Accord created for the normal functioning of this Southeastern European state, but a workable solution is yet to be proposed
The Accord achieved peace by blocking any ability for effective governing and by diminishing the Bosnian state capacity through an excessive dispersion of power with an uncommon constitutional focus on internationalism, and an erroneous type of pluralism that undermines the normal functioning of a democracy
Summary
Most commentators of the Bosnian political situation usually emphasize the problem with the Dayton Accord’s recognition of the Serb-dominated “Republika Srpska” as a sticking point in the normal functioning of Bosnia, while overlooking and ignoring the effects of the Washington Agreement which first invented the “Bosnian Federation” to please Croats in and around the Republic of Bosnia. The existence of the “Bosnian Federation” was further confirmed with a separate document in the Dayton Accord signed on November 10, 1995 where it was noted that the establishment of the Federation is “an essential prerequisite for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina [and that] the responsibilities and the organization of the government of the Federation and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be separated [and that] neither government may interfere in the exclusive competence of the other government.”[3] It even states, unequivocally, that the Government of “the Republic must transfer functions to the Government of the Federation in accordance with the Federation Constitution”[4] and not vice versa Such direction again shows the importance of the creation of the “Bosnian Federation” with the Washington Agreement. The Bosnian citizens vote exclusively for the governments and elected officials of their own entity, but never together for any position, and that presents a problem of how to incrementally build the possibility for a common interest necessary for Bosnia to increase state capacity and move forward
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