A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules under Imperfect Information

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Previous articleNext article No AccessA Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules under Imperfect InformationMichelle J. White, and Donald WittmanMichelle J. White Search for more articles by this author , and Donald Wittman Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 12, Number 2Jun., 1983 Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/467730 Views: 16Total views on this site Citations: 14Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1983 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Philip Daniel, , Alan Krupnick, , Thornton Matheson, , Peter Mullins, , Ian Parry, , Artur Swistak, How Should Shale Gas Extraction Be Taxed?, IMF Working Papers 17, no.254254 (Jan 2017): 1.https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484328491.001Andrzej Baniak, Peter Grajzl Controlling Product Risks When Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2014).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2499596Steven Shavell Corrective Taxation versus Liability as a Solution to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, The Journal of Law and Economics 54, no.S4S4 (Jul 2015): S249–S266.https://doi.org/10.1086/661944Christine Longo, Jeffrey Wagner Bridging legal and economic perspectives on interstate municipal solid waste disposal in the US, Waste Management 31, no.11 (Jan 2011): 147–153.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wasman.2010.08.005Daniel H. Cole Property Creation by Regulation: Rights to Clean Air and Rights to Pollute, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2011).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1660174Florian Jaehn, Peter Letmathe The emissions trading paradox, European Journal of Operational Research 202, no.11 (Apr 2010): 248–254.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.05.007Steven Shavell The Corrective Tax versus Liability as Solutions to the Problem of Harmful Externalities, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2010).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1636359Peter Grajzl, Andrzej Baniak Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts, International Review of Law and Economics 29, no.44 (Dec 2009): 360–374.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.03.004Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort, Jérôme Pouyet The Regulator and the Judge : The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk, Revue d'économie politique Vol. 118, no.66 (Dec 2008): 941–967.https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.186.0941Peter Grajzl, Andrzej Baniak Industry Self-Regulation, Subversion of Justice, and Social Control of Torts, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2008).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1031324John Norregaard, , Valérie Reppelin-Hill, Taxes and Tradable Permits As Instruments for Controlling Pollution: Theory and Practice, IMF Working Papers 00, no.1313 (Jan 2000): 1.https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451842999.001Robert Innes Optimal liability with stochastic harms, judgement-proof injurers, and asymmetric information, International Review of Law and Economics 19, no.22 (Jun 1999): 181–203.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(99)00004-6Paul Burrows Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs, International Review of Law and Economics 19, no.22 (Jun 1999): 227–244.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(99)00006-XRonald E. Grieson, Nirvikar Singh Regulating externalities through testing, Journal of Public Economics 41, no.33 (Apr 1990): 369–387.https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(90)90067-R