A comparison of performances of danish and american students in a “threat game”

Abstract

Two experiments comparing the strategy choice behavior of American and Danish male college students were conducted. In the first experiment bona fide pairs of American and Danish subjects played repeated trials of a variety of 2 × 2 nonzero sum threat games. The results of this first study indicated a number of differences between the two populations in terms of their use of and response to threats. The general pattern of results seemed to support the conjecture that, in the underdog role of the game, Danes are more submissive than Americans. In the top dog role of the game Americans are somewhat more fair than Danes. In the second experiment, 60 Americans and 60 Danish subjects played repeated trials of a variety of threat games against a programmed stooge opponent. Several different stooge strategies were employed so as to systematically vary the behavior of the other. A number of systematic differences between the American and Danish players emerged in terms of their responses to the different stooge strategies. These differences between Americans and Danes playing against the stooge player were consistent with those observed in the bona fide pairs.