Abstract
Rural drinking water systems (RDWS) in Bangladesh and elsewhere fail more often than we would want. The acknowledgment that pure community management models will not reverse this trend is growing: RDWS users need support. In an attempt to further understanding what this support could look like we in particular zoom in on the role of public agencies. We ask, (i) what conditions explain variation in collective action among the end-users of an RDWS? and, (ii) what conditions explain variation in collaboration between RDWS end-users and a public agency? We lean on concepts and insights borrowed from the commons literature. After all, rural drinking water systems can be framed as a commons: its users face appropriation and above all provision dilemmas, that must be solved to avoid failure. Based on this literature we develop a list of enabling conditions for (i) collective action among RDWS end-users, and (ii) collaboration between RDWS end-users, and a public agency. We applied these lists to study the governance of 30 pond sand filter (PSF) systems in the Southwestern coastal area in Bangladesh. Computing correlation, we find that large group size, interdependency among the group members, heterogeneity of endowments, a high level of dependence on resource system, locally devised access and management rules and well-working collaboration between PSF users and the public agency are significantly associated with the occurrence of collective action among PSF users. We also find that the latter (i.e. collaboration between PSF users and the public agency) is positively influenced by transparency and inclusive decision-making procedures, but mostly by a relation that is characterized by trust.
Highlights
Pond sand filter (PSF) systems were introduced in Bangladesh in the early 1990s (Hoque, 2009)
In an attempt to tease out the enabling conditions for collaboration between rural drinking water system users and public agencies we look at clusters of conditions related to user group characteristics, public agency characteristics, the relationship between RSDS users and the public agency, and the institutional arrangements (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Huxham, 2003)
The resulting scores for collective action among pond sand filter (PSF) users were correlated with the scores for each one of the enabling conditions for collective action suggested in the literature on the governance of shared resources
Summary
Pond sand filter (PSF) systems were introduced in Bangladesh in the early 1990s (Hoque, 2009). They are considered a low-tech, easy-to-operate drinking water infrastructure that can provide reasonably priced, safe drinking water, reliably. Drinking Water Systems limited, and roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and not very complex: According to the National Policy for Safe Water and Sanitation (1998) local governments (i.e. Union Parishad and Upazila Parishad) select PSF sites, based on two criteria: the scarcity of drinking water in a community and the availability of a suitable pond. PSF users are responsible for operating and maintaining their drinking water system To this end, they select a designated caretaker who is to be paid through user contributions. In its PSF guidelines, WaterAid Bangladesh (2006) advises forming PSF management committees comprising 6–10 members, including a head, a caretaker, regular members of which minimally two are female
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