Abstract
We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance.
Highlights
A group of agents must be served in a facility
Waiting costs are linear in time and an agent’s waiting cost is known only to the agent
While SP and weakly strategyproof (WSP) imply U-INV, the reverse implication does not hold: the mechanism in Remark 3.5(1) is an example of a mechanism which satisfies U-INV but neither SP nor WSP. Note that in this mechanism, an increase in an agent’s waiting cost can result in her being assigned an inferior queue position. This is incompatible with SP and WSP but compatible with U-INV
Summary
A group of agents must be served in a facility. The facility serves only one agent at a time and agents incur idiosyncratic waiting costs. The objective is to determine the order in which to serve agents and the monetary transfers they should receive This queueing problem has been analyzed extensively from various perspectives (Dolan [3], Suijs [10], Mitra [8], Maniquet [7], Chun [1], [2], Mitra and Mutuswami [9], and others) and many allocation rules have been proposed. Kayi and Ramaekers [6] provide a corrected statement of their characterization We present another characterization of the rule using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategyproofness, upward-invariance. The axioms are similar to that used by Kayi and Ramaekers [5] but our proof is very simple
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