A Challenge to Multiculturalism

Hate crime research has increased, but there are very few studies examining hate crime offenders. It is, therefore, difficult to determine to what extent those who perpetrate this offence might be different from those who have not committed hate crime. This study is the first to provide an account of the demographics and criminal histories of those serving time in prison for committing a hate crime. It is based on a large complete population of offenders in the UK. Hate crime offenders released from prison were found to have prolific criminal careers, having committed a wide range and large number of different types of offences. When compared with those who committed a general (non-hate) violent offence, violent hate crime offenders were significantly older and were considerably more prolific in their previous offending. Violent hate crime appeared quantitatively, as opposed to qualitatively, different from violent non-hate crime, but this was less clearly true when those who had committed public order hate crime were compared with other public order offenders. Interventions to reduce the later offending of violent hate crime offenders should be based on the effective interventions that exist for violent offenders, but should take into account knowledge about the surprisingly prolific criminal careers of hate crime offenders.

This study addresses the question what makes hate crime incidents newsworthy and which factors are conducive to such incidents being reported on. Relying on news value theory, we identify criteria (cultural proximity, conflict) that explain why some hate crimes make the news and why others do not. We use a dataset of police-registered hate crimes in the Netherlands in 2017 (N = 3379). This is the entire population of hate crimes that the police reported in the whole country. This allows us to disentangle dynamics of the news selection process and identify bias. We find that both target group and type of hate crime affect the newsworthiness: hate crimes with victims targeted due to religious motives (Islamophobia, anti-Semitism) are more likely to be covered; hate crimes based on sexual orientation, gender and ethnicity are less likely to pass the gates. Hate crimes that are more conflictual in nature (i.e., violent hate crimes, vandalism) are more likely to be covered too. These selection effects likely have important effects on public awareness and political reactions.

As the number of refugees rises across the world, anti-refugee violence has become a pressing concern. What explains the incidence and support of such hate crime? We argue that fears among native men that refugees pose a threat in the competition for female partners is a critical but understudied factor driving hate crime. Employing a comprehensive dataset on the incidence of hate crime across Germany, we first demonstrate that hate crime rises where men face disadvantages in local mating markets. Next, we deploy an original four-wave panel survey to confirm that support for hate crime increases when men fear that the inflow of refugees makes it more difficult to find female partners. Mate competition concerns remain a robust predictor even when controlling for anti-refugee views, perceived job competition, general frustration, and aggressiveness. We conclude that a more complete understanding of hate crime must incorporate mating markets and mate competition.

How do expressions of support or opposition by the U.S. federal government, influence violent hate crimes against specific racial and ethnic minorities? In this article, we test two hypotheses derived from Blalock's (1967) conceptualization of intergroup power contests. The political threat hypothesis predicts that positive government attention toward specific groups would lead to more hateful violence directed against them. The emboldenment hypothesis predicts that negative government attention toward specific groups would also lead to more hateful violence directed against them. Using combined data on U.S. government actions and federal hate crime statistics from 1992 through 2012, vector autoregression models provide support for both hypotheses, depending on the protected group involved. We conclude that during this period, African Americans were more vulnerable to hate crimes motivated by political threat, and Latinx persons were more vulnerable to hate crimes motivated by emboldenment.

The present study provides an initial attempt to assess the impact of extremist right electoral support on racially motivated and extremist violent crime rates across Slovak regions. We transcend previous research by examining associations between national and regional elections, immigration rates, vote-shares, and violent hate crime rates utilizing temporal statistics on racially motivated and extremist violent crimes, which are linked with data on support for nationalist parties and on indicators of socio-economic development. Results illustrate that extreme right parties matter, such that the higher their electoral vote-shares, the higher the violent hate crime incidence and victimization rates. We, also, find that high immigration rates strengthen the effect of electoral vote-shares on bias crime in Slovakia.

This paper aims to examine the significance of xenophobia and hate crimes in multicultural societies. It begins with outlining the general discussions about multiculturalism, xenophobia and hate crimes. It identifies hate crimes that related to xenophobia in multicultural society and introduces hate crime laws in Australia. While Australian multicultural policy has its roots in government responses to the post settlement issues facing migrants, through the 1980s and 1990s policy was articulated more broadly as an element of Australia's nation building narratives. Today all Australian States and Territories have active policies and programs dealing with multiculturalism. As other multicultural societies, Australia confronts with challenges in building a multicultural society. One of them is xenophobia and hate crimes related to race, ethnic, religions. A number of common law countries have introduced legislation designed to respond to the problem of prejudice-related crime, commonly referred to as hate crime law. Whilst the heavier penalties imposed by hate crime laws are designed to denounce, and thereby deter, prejudice-related violence, it is apparent that these laws are meant to do more than punish and deter. They aim to condemn, not just criminal conduct per se, but also racism, homophobia, religious intolerance and the like. In this way Australia seek to make a broad moral claim that prejudice is wrong and to thereby reinforce pro-social values of tolerance and respect for marginalized and disadvantaged groups. This paper argues that hate crime laws are necessary in order to prevent hate crimes related to multiculturalism and suggests that Australian hate crime laws can be implied to sustain multiculturalism in Korea.

Much of the academic, practitioner and voluntary sector interest in victims of hate crime have focused upon the impacts of hate crime and the practical and emotional support needs and services for victims. Our own work has been somewhat divergent from this. We were commissioned to identify how hate crime reporting could be improved in a northern town, and made inclusive across different equality groups. We undertook a small scale study that examined individual decision making by hate crime victims in whether or not to report incidents, and how the available reporting arrangements and associated publicity materials affected these decisions (Wong & Christmann, 2008). Somewhat to our surprise, what appeared to be a critical issue in terms of whether or not hate crime policies were likely to succeed was also a much under researched area. Whilst our own research findings cannot be generalised beyond the study site, it did allow us to test out and consider more thoroughly some of the assumptions implicit in policy developments around hate crime reporting, specifically the policy goal of full reporting. We want to reflect back on these findings and the broader research literature to pose some questions on the adequacy and utility of the current reporting agencies approaches and the general policy direction to hate crime victims. We believe this has merit because the statutory criminal justice agencies and the voluntary sector are grappling with the challenges of adopting hate crime in its broadest sense, and providing a responsive, effective and victim centred service across markedly different vulnerable groups. Pertinent questions can be asked about what the current policies on hate crime can be expected to achieve given the nature of victim decision making on the critical issue of whether to report their victimisation. We will draw out some implications that the legacy of the Lawrence Inquiry has had for strategic thinking, policy making and make some tentative suggestions on how these might be improved. We argue something that may be considered heresy among hate crime victimloogy circles and victim campaigning groups; that the current policy message concerning victim reporting does not reflect reality, and risks being discredited. What is required, some 10 years post Lawrence is more nuanced responses and ones which acknowledge: the distance travelled by criminal justice agencies in the intervening years; that the majority of hate crime is manifested as single incidents of harassment (which may not necessarily constitute crimes); and the unlikelihood of full reporting by the public, which realistically fits where the public are in terms of their expectations. In doing so we do not pretend to have any authoritative answers to these issues, but believe the questions are worth posing to prompt a debate between efficacy of response versus a largely unchallenged view of hate crime victimology.

In the paper, we focus on the statistical detection and understanding of signaling behavior via various media outlets that are associated with a violent hate crime. Following a body of theory that identifies the links between hate rhetoric with violence, we explore textual patterns of hate speech in traditional and non-traditional media outlets, including television news shows, social media, political blogs, and political forums, to detect an association with hate crime events per time and place. Applying the dynamical system theory, we can characterize the dynamic behaviors of essential keywords. Grouping keyword with similar temporal signatures enables us to highlight important information/topics corresponding to emerging events. We also introduce SpacePhaser, an interactive visual tool for textual pattern analysis. To show the usefulness of SpacePhaser, we demonstrate the results of its applications on various real-world datasets.

ABSTRACTTesting propositions from ethnic competition theory, we examine contextual and individual determinants of support for restrictive immigration policies in 26 European Union member states between 2002 and 2013, a period characterized by enduring economic downturn. We hypothesize that natives in vulnerable economic positions, similar to many migrants, are more restrictive toward immigration, because they perceive more economic strain and more ethnic threat. We expect that natives are more restrictive in times of economic decline – when national unemployment rates and debts increase – especially those who hold similar economic positions as many migrants. We enriched European Social Survey data (2002–2013, containing more than 210,000 respondents) with cross-national data on the economic situation. We indeed find that support for immigration restrictiveness is higher among natives in more vulnerable socio-economic positions. They perceive more economic strain, which is directly related to restrictiveness. But economic strain also increases perceptions of ethnic threat, which is strongly related to restrictiveness. We do, however, not find strong empirical evidence that economic decline more strongly affects support for restrictive immigration policies among vulnerable economic groups. Stronger changes in national debts induce more restrictiveness among the full population, but especially among those who perceive more economic strain and more ethnic threat.

The Hate Crimes Project in the United States, the expanded use of criminal legislation creating enhanced punishment for bias-motivated crimes, is now over twenty-five years old. Today, virtually every state expressly criminalizes bias crimes. Over this quarter century, states have employed different forms of bias crime laws, some focusing on the animus exhibited by the perpetrator of a crime against a member (actual or perceived) of a racial, ethnic, religious, or other included Group, others focusing on the perpetrator's discriminatory selection of his or her victim. Now is therefore a propitious time to begin to evaluate the societal gains and risks associated with bias crime, law enforcement. This paper sets out a framework from which to understand bias crime law, and then considers and addresses many of the issues raised by opponents of the bias crime program. The paper considers four issues in particular. First, opponents have argued that the enhanced punishment of bias crime calls greater attention to racial and ethnic differences in society, therefore exacerbating, not helping, social divisions. Second, those opposed to expanded prosecution for bias-motivated crimes have argued that the bias crime enforcement unconstitutionally, or in any event unwisely, punishes thought and expression, not criminal acts. Third, bias crimes opponents have argued that the potential for selective enforcement of bias crime statutes exists, harming the most disadvantaged members of society and ironically those whom bias crime laws are intended to help. Fourth, opponents question one of the prime justifications for the enhanced punishment of bias crimes - that these crimes cause a greater harm than similar crime without bias motivation - claiming that the bias motivation of the perpetrator per se is not the cause of the harm. Bias crimes per se, the argument goes, should not receive enhanced punishment, rather only crimes, any crimes, that cause these great harms. Finally, the paper offers some observations as to the most general challenge that may be asserted against bias crimes laws: the argument that these laws don't work, that is, that these laws do not prevent or even appreciably reduce levels of bias in society, or even levels of bias crimes. The paper argues that in some ways there is no real answer to this question of whether bias crime laws work but I further argue, in the classic words of the late Alexander Bickel, that no answer is what the wrong question begets. Instead of asking questions about reduction of certain types of crime or ever more so, certain types of social attitudes, we do better to ask whether bias crime laws punish that which society rightly condemns. Taking that path, we are led toward the implications of using bias crime law as a window into a society's self-perception as a multi-cultural society. The extent to which this will end bigotry in society will inevitably be an inquiry that is more aspirational than empirical.

This article will focus on the role emotions play in individuals in violent urban gangs committing hate crimes. A definition of urban gang will be provided and it will differ from the concept of urban tribe. Places where these individuals perform and act will also be explained in detail. This article will also explain signs that serve as reference within the Spanish legal context to determine whether there has been a hate crime. Questions such as “why are hate crimes not reported?” will be answered. The description of urban gangs used here does exist in our society nowadays. The use of emotions in individuals who belong to urban gangs that commit violent hate crimes will be analysed. Features found in violent urban gangs such as Skinhead will also be explained. There are two different branches in Skinhead gangs: Neonazis and Antifascists. Lastly and upon the implementation of the Framework Decision 913/2008/JAI to the Spanish penal code, an analysis on the current legislation in Spain to protect vulnerable groups as well as victims of hate crimes will be offered in detail.

We estimate the prevalence and characteristics of violent hate crime victimization of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people in the United States, and we compare them to non-LGBT hate crime victims and to LGBT victims of violent non-hate crime. We analyze pooled 2017-2019 data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (n persons = 553, 925;n incidents = 32, 470), the first nationally representative and comprehensive survey on crime that allows identification of LGBT persons aged 16 or older. Descriptive and bivariate analysis show that LGBT people experienced 6.6 violent hate crime victimizations per 1,000 persons compared with non-LGBT people's 0.6 per 1,000 persons (odds ratio = 8.30, 95% confidence interval = 1.94, 14.65). LGBT people were more likely to be hate crime victims of sexual orientation or gender bias crime and less likely to be victims of race or ethnicity bias crimes compared to non-LGBT hate crime victims. Compared to non-LGBT victims, LGBT victims of hate crime were more likely to be younger, have a relationship with their assailant, and have an assailant who is white. Compared to LGBT victims of non-hate violence, more LGBT hate crime victims reported experiencing problems in their social lives, negative emotional responses, and physical symptoms of distress. Our findings affirm claims that hate crimes have adverse physical and psychological effects on victims and highlight the need to ensure that LGBT persons who experience hate crime get necessary support and services in the aftermath of the crime.

Hate crime refers to criminal offenses that are motivated by the rejection of a victim on the basis of a perceived or actual affiliation with certain identity groups. In Austria, particular vulnerable groups are listed under the offense of incitement (§238 StGB): Hate crimes are crimes against members of a church or religious community or another group of persons defined by the criteria race, skin color, nationality, decent or ethnic origin, gender, disability, age, sexual orientation or a particular world view. Official statistics show that the proportion of juveniles in hate crime is significantly higher than their proportion in total crime. This article presents findings on hate crime and discrimination from the Austrian survey of the International Self-Report Delinquency Study (ISRD). The survey was conducted in 2022 in public schools of all school types among students in Grades 8, 9, 10, and 11 and was aimed at young people aged 14 to 17. The analysis reveals personal characteristics, attitudes, and lifestyles of offenders and victims and shows the most important targets of victimization, including physical appearance, xenophobia, racism, and homophobia. Hate crimes are experienced as personal violence and as hate speech on social media and they are closely linked to experiences of discrimination. Life-time victimization rates of hate crimes of approximately 25% show that collective identities have become major targets in conflicts among young people in late modern multicultural societies.

Changes in the international situation during the last decades have become the reason for new conflicts and aggravations at the national level. The 2015 European migrant crisis (Refugee crisis), 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine have become a catalyst for increase in hate crimes. In order to recognize the criminal offense as a hate crime in the sense of the Latvian regulatory framework, it is necessary to establish two criteria: (a) the composition of the criminal offence is included in the Criminal Law; (b) a motive of hatred against a particular protected group of society can be stated in the criminal offence. It is the motive – hate or prejudice – that distinguishes hate crimes from other types of crimes.Prejudice is a negative assessment of a social group and its members. These are objectively unfounded assumptions and erroneous generalizations that, in the opinion of the offender, separate the representatives of this group from the rest of society. Persistent prejudices are called stereotypes. Unlike prejudice, stereotypes are not necessarily negative in nature. However, stereotypes are not based on objective truth either. It follows from court practice that hate crimes were directed against several groups of Latvian society: against ethnic groups (Latvians, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Gypsies or Roma, etc.), against representatives of various religious denominations, against asylum seekers, against people from other countries, against sexual minorities as well as against other groups. Stereotypes are often based on personal or negative cultural experiences of previous generations.In this context, it can be mentioned that it is specifically culture that is the basic factor according to which it is possible to understand, identify and reduce hate speech. Professor Aleksandrs Krugļevskis believed that with a change in cultural understanding, expanding public participation in cultural processes, the level of legal awareness will rise and tendencies, intentions to commit a criminal offense will disappear. Criminal law as a cultural factor creates a system that corresponds to the level of education and culture of the people. The above also corresponds to the vision of Latvia’s cohesive society policy “Guidelines for Cohesive and Active Civil Society 2021–2027”: mutual trust, participation, and cooperation between different social groups have improved among Latvian residents, and the level of tolerance has increased, stereotypes and prejudices against different social group representatives have decreased.Statistical data show that since the start of the war in Ukraine, the number of registered hate crimes in Latvia has increased. These show the relevance of the chosen topic. The authors of the article offer their vision of the problem of hate crimes, studying hate crimes as a cultural phenomenon, paying special attention to the experience of Latvian society in this area.

This article examines and explains the rise of ‘hate crime’ as a category recognised by the German state. It documents the transition from a fluid and unspecific concern about violence against vulnerable groups in the immediate post-unification years to the formal adoption of ‘hate crime’ and its counterpart ‘right-wing politically motivated crime’ as official statistical categories. It uses theories of policymaking coupled with insights from scholarship on sociological uncertainty and policy transfer to explain the adoption, adaptation, and limitations of the hate crime concept in Germany.