Abstract
We present a model to analyze the influence of the offer right in bilateral bargainings, which is characterized by two variables, that is, the frequency to make offers and the right to make first offer. The solution concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is adopted. We also give the strategy for mediator to regulate the bargain position of players by means of choosing offer right.
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