A belief systems analysis of fraud beliefs following the 2020 US election.

Abstract

Beliefs that the US 2020 Presidential election was fraudulent are prevalent despite substantial contradictory evidence. Why are such beliefs often resistant to counter-evidence? Is this resistance rational, and thus subject to evidence-based arguments, or fundamentally irrational? Here we surveyed 1,642 Americans during the 2020 vote count, testing fraud belief updates given hypothetical election outcomes. Participants' fraud beliefs increased when their preferred candidate lost and decreased when he won, and both effects scaled with partisan preferences, demonstrating partisan asymmetry (desirability effects). A Bayesian model of rational updating of a system of beliefs-beliefs in the true vote winner, fraud prevalence and beneficiary of fraud-accurately accounted for this partisan asymmetry, outperforming alternative models of irrational, motivated updating and models lacking the full belief system. Partisan asymmetries may not reflect motivated reasoning, but rather rational attributions over multiple potential causes of evidence. Changing such beliefs may require targeting multiple key beliefs simultaneously rather than direct debunking attempts.