Abstract
I propose a formal model of reciprocity in clientelism, applying Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) equilibrium concept, sequential reciprocity equilibrium, to an election. If voters are motivated not only by material payoffs but also by psychological payoffs resulting from engaging in the reciprocal exchange of votes for private goods, voters would vote for a politician providing private goods in a one-shot game even when the voters are strong opposers on policy grounds and the politician does not have any detection technology. The model also shows that the amount of private goods required for reciprocal voters is smaller than the amount required for purely materialistic voters. Furthermore, I modify the model in order to examine psychological channels through which norms of reciprocity intervene in the effects of poverty, social identity, voter education, compulsory voting, and post-election violence on clientelism; the modified models yield results that are broadly consistent with existing empirical studies.
Published Version
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