中國大陸省級領導人仕途發展的制度化，1993-2010：以個人特徵與經濟表現為焦點之分析

Abstract

From the perspective of the institutionalization of elite recruitment, this thesis investigates the characteristics of institutionalization in the career development of provincial leaders in mainland China since the 14th Party Congress, using personal characteristics and economic performance as two key focus points. The thesis’s research subjects are provincial leaders—provincial party committee secretaries and provincial government senior officials—who left office between 1993 and 2010. The thesis employs both administrative position rank and an evaluation standard for political importance to reexamine their official career development. It uses the binary logit model statistical method to research how both personal characteristics such as personal background, professional specializations , early promotion, career experience, and current office conditions, and economic performance factors such as economic growth during the term of office, government finances, and common people’s economic livelihoods, influence provincial leaders’ career trajectories. The thesis’s main findings are: First, some personal characteristics of provincial leaders can explain their career development, particularly age, term of office, and the socioeconomic conditions in their province during their leadership term. Over time from the Jiang Zemin era through the Hu Jintao era, there appears a trend toward institutionalization, with an increase in the explanatory power of personal characteristics on one hand and a decrease in the impact of informal politics on the other. Age and career experience have become the primary indicators of promotion. Additionally, there is difference in the degree of implementation of institutionalization between provincial party committee secretaries and provincial governors. The upper age limit of 65 years-old for provincial leaders clearly restricts provincial party secretaries, while factors in elite transformation such as college major specialization and career experience appear only to occur in the promotion of provincial governors. In the area of economic performance, local economic growth is still a decisive factor in provincial leaders’ career development. In this area, the central government has adopted a performance review system that compares incumbent’s economic performance with his predecessor’s, and tries to stimulate economic performance by rewarding their good results with promotion and their bad results with demotion or retirement. Moreover, the thesis has discovered that there is not necessarily a direct correlation between economic performance and career development, but rather that they can also share an indirect relationship; economic growth rates that are three to five percent higher compared to the previous term are viewed favorably, while higher growth rates actually have a negative impact on career development. The presence of such a suitable growth interval for local economic improvement reflects the central government’s twin development pursuits of growth and maintaining economic stability. In addition, when the influence of personal characteristics and economic performance are compared, it can be seen that age has already become a firm condition for provincial leaders’ career advancement. Age both serves as a threshold that eliminates promotion opportunities for leaders close to 65 years-old, and works as an extra bonus that aids the promotion of younger leaders. Though economic performance and term of office are not as pivotal as age as conditions for promotion, economic performance can be important in determining promotion when possible contenders are of the same age, or in convincing the central government to assign a leader a second term in office, which gives him advantage in securing promotion later. The younger age of provincial leaders is a central feature of the CCP’s elite recruitment, but administrative accomplishments, especially economic performance, still receive significant weight in the Center’s personnel arrangements.