Abstract

Kim Il Sung’s 1984 tour of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was driven by the need to acquire modern weapons, secure recognition of the hereditary regime, and obtain support for tripartite talks between the ROK, North Korea, and the US in the face of North Korea’s economic downturn. In early 1984, after verifying the trip’s authenticity, the ROK government began to seek information about Kim Il Sung’s itinerary through its diplomatic missions. Despite domestic and international assessments that Kim Il Sung’s visit to the Soviet Union was a failure, the ROK government saw gains in the acquisition of modern weapons and the recognition of the hereditary succession. In East Germany, for example, a treaty of friendship along with an economic and scientific agreement was signed. However, only ceremonial and formal events took place in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary with Yugoslavia and Romania simultaneously criticizing the United States and the Soviet Union, emphasizing the possibility of non-aligned countries. Kim Il Sung’s diplomatic trip intensified the ROK government’s sense of crisis regarding its northern policy. In 1984, the ROK government’s European relations were characterized by proxy diplomacy—sending delegations to Western Europe to try to strengthen ties with Eastern Europe and increasing cultural and sports exchanges with Eastern Europe. Eventually, coinciding with the international transformation of the Cold War system, all of the Eastern European communist countries that Kim Il Sung had traveled to participated in the Seoul Olympics and achieved high rankings.

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