1866: why the Russian bomb did not explode

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe fall of the Berlin Wall has provided access to archives in Central and Eastern Europe and especially in Russia; new theses may be written as long as they remain open and they often show that our conceptions of international relations during the nineteenth century are outdated and mistaken. This contribution takes as a starting point the events of 1866 that we can consider to be a major turning point in nineteenth century Europe: the end of a relative and concerted balance of powers in central Europe, the first step towards the creation of a unitary German State. The article uses them here to question Russian foreign policy during a transitional decade of its history, through an analysis of the figure and missions of Minister Aleksandr Gorchakov. In order to do this, the article relies on completely new and varied material in four languages: diplomatic archives, personal archives, and a meticulous study of the press. The conclusions reached have been hitherto unseen and they put into question what was thought to be known regarding Russia's political line after the Crimean War. Now it is no longer possible to consider that Russian policy in Europe has been passive, conservative, and pro-German.