미국의 독자적 대북제재 현황과 해제 프로세스 연구

Abstract

U.S.sanctions are based on U.S. foreign policy concerns about international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD), national security, and communism. U.S. sanctions against North Korea began in earnest after North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006 and its fourth nuclear test and long-range missile launch in 2016. The U.S. has imposed sanctions on North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and the International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), which are comprehensive sanctions measures. The U.S. has imposed sanctions on North Korea since the Korean War in 1950, and since 2016, the U.S. sanctions program has constituted the most powerful all-round pressure tool in the history of the U.S. sanctions program. U.S. sanctions are binding because they are centered on the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which can impose substantial sanctions on violators through “secondary sanctions”. However, given that there have been cases where U.S. sanctions have been relaxed or completely lifted due to changes in U.S. policy or negotiations with sanctioned countries or normalization of relations, it is possible to predict that U.S. unilateral sanctions on North Korea could also be relaxed or lifted. Through a detailed analysis of the cases of Vietnam and Iran, which are representative of the successes and failures of the U.S. in easing and lifting unilateral sanctions, we analyze the implications and prospects of easing and lifting U.S. unilateral sanctions on North Korea according to the trend of denuclearization negotiations between North Korea and the United States. The fact that the U.S. has pursued comprehensive agreements and phased sanctions relief in its sanctions relief and lifting process; that it has not lifted economic sanctions until the diplomatic objectives it sought to achieve through economic sanctions were met, even if it took a long time; and that it has reimposed sanctions even after reaching agreements through comprehensive agreements, utilizing snapback provisions if the sanctioned country did not implement the agreement in good faith and did not meet U.S. political and diplomatic interests have important implications for the sanctions relief and lifting process. It is important to note that even if the U.S. eventually reaches a comprehensive agreement through denuclearization negotiations with North Korea, sanctions relief could be delayed for a significant period of time or reimposed if North Korea fails to properly implement its nuclear disabling measures. In addition, it is important to monitor the progress of the U.S. sanctions removal process and the North Korea-U.S. denuclearization negotiations and prepare an action plan for each scenario in advance for inter-Korean exchange and cooperation projects and North Korea policy.