ВЗАИМООТНОШЕНИЯ МОНОГОРОДОВ И ГРАДООБРАЗУЮЩИХ ПРЕДПРИЯТИЙ ЧЕРЕЗ ПРИЗМУ ТЕОРИИ ИГР

Abstract

The paper analyzes the relationship between a city-forming enterprise and local authorities in creating social infrastructure facilities and their functioning in a single-industry town. City-forming enterprises significantly determine the effectiveness of particular territories - single-industry towns, while exerting a comprehensive impact on their socio-economic situation and territorial development. Due to the peculiarities of their location and functioning, city-forming enterprises often assume obligations to create and maintain social infrastructure facilities. In this paper, we will consider the players’ interest in social infrastructure facilities functioning, and will also determine the impact of its development level on the activities of a city-forming enterprise and a single-industry town. In the article, through the application of game theory, the interests and strategies of behavior of the two main players on the issue of creating new or financing old objects of the social infrastructure of a monotown are considered. In the model proposed by the authors, two players are considered. Player A is the town-forming enterprise, and Player B is the local government. Each of the players has two strategies of behavior, the first strategy is to provide financial assistance to social infrastructure facilities, and the second is not to provide financial assistance. Having created a matrix of results, we will determine the payoffs of the players, which will further help us find the Nash equilibrium and determine the Pareto efficiency. Additionally, the work will consider the duality of the results, which will demonstrate the inconsistency of the functioning of the model when using only the rules of game theory and taking into account only market factors without taking into account real social conditions.