央地两级政府生态治理行动的演化博弈分析——基于财政分权视角

Abstract

PDF HTML阅读 XML下载 导出引用 引用提醒 央地两级政府生态治理行动的演化博弈分析——基于财政分权视角 DOI: 10.5846/stxb201803230578 作者: 作者单位: 东北林业大学,辽宁大学,哈尔滨商业大学 作者简介: 通讯作者: 中图分类号: 基金项目: 国家自然科学基金面上项目（71373039）；教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目（NCET-13-0712）；哈尔滨商业大学博士科研启动项目（13DW034） Evolutionary game analysis of ecological rehabilitation between central and local governments: From the perspective of fiscal decentralization Author: Affiliation: School of Economics and Management，Northeast Forestry University,School of Economics and Management，Northeast Forestry University, Fund Project: 摘要 | 图/表 | 访问统计 | 参考文献 | 相似文献 | 引证文献 | 资源附件 | 文章评论 摘要:生态环境是人类社会经济发展过程中的重要组成部分，然而由于粗放的经济发展模式，生态系统退化严重，影响人类幸福感和可持续发展。中央政府和地方政府是生态环境的主要治理主体，因此研究两类群体在生态治理过程中的行为互动机制具有较强的现实意义。基于财政分权的背景，从微观主体的收益函数出发，构建央地两级政府生态治理行动的演化博弈模型，探究两类主体的行为特征及其影响因素。根据复制动态方程分析参与主体的演化规律，采用MATLAB仿真工具分析不同情形下演化均衡状态及收敛趋势。研究结果表明，中央政府与地方政府在一定程度上都是"理性经济人"，系统稳定均衡策略取决于地方政府"严格执行"生态治理的净收益和中央政府"严格监管"的净收益，其中关键指标包括：地方政府生态治理执行力度和成本、政绩考核体系中生态指标和经济指标的权重系数、中央政府的监管成本、监管力度和惩罚金额。据此提出"财政分权同时创新地方政绩考核机制、发展比较优势、拓宽监管渠道"等对策建议，引导央地两级政府共同促进生态治理工作有效实施。 Abstract:Ecological environment is important, but degrades seriously, and the extensive mode of economic development can affect human well-being and sustainable development. It is highly significant to study the interaction mechanisms between the central and local governments because they are the main governing bodies of the ecological environment rehabilitation. Based on the background of fiscal decentralization, we constructed an evolutionary game model between the central and local governments, using the profit function to explore their behavioral characteristics as well as influencing factors. According to the replicator of dynamic equation, this study analyzes the behavior evolution laws of participants and uses the MATLAB simulation tools to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategies of the two groups and their convergence trend under different situations. Our results show that the central and local governments represent "economic men" to a certain extent. The stable equilibrium point depends on the net income of local government when they choice the strategy of "strictly implement", and the net income of central government when they choice the strategy of "strictly regulation". The key indicators include the implementation degree, costs, ecological and economic indicators' weight coefficient of the local government's ecological rehabilitation, as well as the central government's regulatory supervision, costs, punishment, and other factors. The above analysis puts forward the countermeasures, such as fiscal decentralization during the innovation of the local performance evaluation mechanism, following comparative development advantages, and widening of the regulatory channels of the central and local governments to guide the improvement of the efficiency of ecological rehabilitation. 参考文献 相似文献 引证文献