Abstract

This paper interprets the political context upon which the Sino-American macroeconomic imbalances developed from the mid 1990s until the 2008 global financial crisis. Challenging the general way of viewing the event as a symptom of the declining American hegemony with China rising as an alternative hegemon, this paper argues that it was a proof showing the persistent US’ hegemonic power embedded in the contemporary international financial monetary system. For this purpose, this work analyzes the policies employed by the US and China in the wake of the recession caused by the 2000 stock market breakdown. In response to the possible crisis at the time, the US pursued drastic expansionary policies without renouncing any key policy goals including tax cuts and military build-up, while China, whose wealth and growth depended a lot on the dollar, had no choice but to support the value of the dollar and US assets with domestic consumption further repressed. This was a typical example showing the way in which the US’ structural monetary power, the state’s power to be free from the pressures of adjusting macroeconomic imbalances, is used. As the build-up of the US-China imbalances until the 2008 crisis was also made in this context, the imbalances between them should be interpreted as a symbol of the persistent US monetary hegemony rather than a symptom of hegemonic transition.

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