Abstract
This paper examines who should determine the qualities of food served in the domestic market. I construct a differentiated duopoly model of international trade with substitute goods when domestic and foreign firms compete in the domestic market. I show that neither firms nor importing country’s government can choose the quality level of the products which is the optimal from the world welfare point of view. But the quality level that the domestic welfare-maximizing government chooses is higher than that of the firms do.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
