칸트 선험적 인식론에 대한 듀이의 비판 일고찰

Abstract

I. Kant’s transcendental epistemology is known to suppose dualistic thinking in that it attempted to explain knowledge as a synthesis of the subject and its object in an ‘external’ relationship, and as a synthesis of Thing-in-itself and phenomenon. According to J. Dewey, in order to overcome this epistemological dualism, we must understand our reason as an organic concept, and the subject and its object must be understood as parts inseparably connected to the organism. Dewey’s experimental theory of knowledge is based on this concept of reason and explains knowledge through the activity of reason, that is, ‘inquiry’ (thinking, reflection). According to Dewey’s theory, knowledge is established in the functional relationships between ‘concepts’(hypotheses) and ‘facts’(results) as key elements of the process of inquiry, and in this case the validity of knowledge is not depend on the foundation of certainty as Thing-in-itself but on the security of those functional relationships. However, Dewey’s functionalist way of thinking falls short in correctly establishing the validity of knowledge. According to D. W. Hamlyn, the validity of knowledge cannot be explained without agreement in judgment with other peoples, and therefore agreement in forms of life is an indispensable condition for elucidating the objectivity and truth of knowledge. In light of Hamlyn’s opinion, unlike Dewey’s criticism of Kant, the transcendental concepts and Thing-in-itself in Kant’s epistemology can be reinterpreted in relation to forms of life.