Проблема восприятия: дизъюнктивизм vs репрезента­ционализм

Abstract

The article explores discussions surrounding the problem of perception, the grounds of which can be explicated through the antinomy between two components: the argument from the transparency of experience and the argument from hallucination. In general, the argument from transparency is used to justify direct realism, and the argument from hal­lucination is usually associated with attempts to refute direct realism and establish the sense-data theory. The latter has a rich history in analytical philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century, but ultimately philosophers came to the conclusion that it had seri­ous theoretical flaws. In the second half of the twentieth century, the position of represen­tationalism became orthodox, which not only retained some of the realistic intuitions of direct realists, but blocked the argument from hallucination. The article demonstrates that if we accept the common kind assumption, then representationalism “loses” material ob­jects as constituents of perception, as in the case of the theory of sense-data. In recent decades, direct realism in the form of disjunctivism has returned to the battlefield in the philosophy of perception. Within its framework, the common kind assumption is blocked, which makes it possible to protect the ontology of direct realism without facing the disad­vantages of the representationalist option. Nevertheless, the author proposes his own ap­proach to solving the problem of perception, revealing a problematic presupposition com­mon to both components of the antinomy. It turns out to be a methodological principle that connects introspective theses with metaphysical ones, which is faced with an ana­logue of the problem of the guillotine of D. Hume. The author concludes that although the problem of perception loses its foundation, this does not devalue the very discussions about the conceptions of perception. Rather, it indicates the need for reflection on the very methodology of modern philosophy of perception.