Abstract

Since long time ago, Korean people have taken a skeptical view of the independency and political neutrality of the Board of Audit and Inspection as a constitutional institution because the Presidents in Korea have often repeated to indirectly expel the existing commissioners before the completion of their tenures after the President started his or her term and appoint his or her close aids as the commissioners of the Board.
 Recently, just after the new Administration had recommended the early retirement of the chairpersons of the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission and Communications Commission before the completion of their tenures, the Board of Audit and Inspection started the inspection of the two Commissions to seemingly oppress the chairpersons. These incidents aroused the public response which demanded the extensive reforms for the Board of Audit and Inspection in Korea.
 For the above reasons, this paper will, at first, examine the provisions concerned with the independency and political neutrality in the Constitution and the Board of Audit and Inspection Act. And then, it will reveal the problems in administering the Board of Audit and Inspection concerned with its independency and political neutrality and compare with the Supreme Audit institutions in U.K., U.S.A., Germany, Japan and France. Finally, this paper will suggest the reform measures to secure the independency and political neutrality of the Board of Audit and Inspection in Korea through the revision of the Constitution.

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