공공기관의 지대추구에 관한 연구

Abstract

Public Institutions usually are provided public grants supporting commissioned official projects, and/or, are secured monopolistic incomes by law. This comparative advantageous position allows them to act as not only rent-seeker but subagent(namely, agent of government). Using qualitative analysis with 3 public institutions cases, this article identified moral hazard of public institutions exerting rent seeking activities in appropriating governmental grants, taking advantage of some legal blanks in accounting of public institutions. Result revealed vivid phenomena of rent seeking by public institutions. They receive governmental grants before implementing their projects. The time gap between their receiving grants and implementing it lead them to earn some interest incomes, which they appropriate to their benefit against legal restrictions. Benefit of principal(government) tend to be neglected. Instead, benefit of agents(public institution) were more valued, showing the typical principal-agent problem. Though public institutions can be regarded as part of ‘government’ in broad sense, this study revealed they do act as active rent seekers. By recognizing their rent-seeking role, more effective reforms can be imagined. It can include abolishing, redistributing, and elastic distributing of grants, according to previous achievements. The measures seems to be far better than just present ‘give-and-strong control’.