Abstract
The paper recapitulates basic problems that arise in the game-theoretic models, when traditional assumptions about the rationality of players are violated. Some examples of bounded rationality models describing the strategic interdependence of players are provided. In particular we consider the theories of oligopolistic behavior, the models of bounded strategic thinking, equilibrium in secure strategies and equilibria contained by counter-threats. We discuss the ways to reconcile the traditional and boundedly rational approaches. We briefly review the main strands of modern game theory aimed at developing a generalized concept of rationality, which would incorporate strategic interaction and farsighted strategic thinking of players. Promising directions include interactive epistemology, learning theory and evolutionary models.
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