Феноменология в парадигме натуралистического поворота

Abstract

The subject matter of the paper proposed can be defined as one of the most sig­nificant contemporary trends in interrelation between philosophy and cognitive sciences (as far as cognition and consciousness studies are concerned), that is natural extensions of phenomenology in the framework of neurophenomenol­ogy’s paradigm (F. Varela, E. Thompson, D. Zahavi, S. Gallagher). Proposed integrative models of phenomenology and neurobiology: phenomenological analysis of introspective presumptions of psychological and neurosciences’ ex­periments, phenomenological participation in experimental design’s formation, at last, phenomenological analysis of psychological and neurosciences’ concep­tual resources’ investigations have clearly been examined in the light of classical Husserl’s phenomenology. As this paper intends to show, in cognition and con­sciousness studies it seems methodologically more correct to speak not about integrative models (as proposed), but rather about research strategies’ comple­mentarity, mutual enhancement of cognitive sciences, neuroscience and phe­nomenology. Nevertheless both ontological and epistemological presumptions in their philosophical foundations (V.S. Stepin) are irreducible to phenomeno­logical ones. The final conclusion is that the term “neurophenomenology” seems not to be rigorous philosophical concept, but rather interdisciplinary metaphor, which presents contemporary aspiration to integrate the results achieved in phi­losophy and different fields of disciplinary researches. It interlocks naturalistic attitude to verified truth’s destination with constructive-realistic perspective of the human reason.