Mechanistic explanations in the cognitive social sciences: Lessons from three case studies

Matti Sarkia,Tuukka Kaidesoja,Mikko Hyyryläinen

doi:10.1177/0539018420968742

Matti Sarkia, Tuukka Kaidesoja + Show 1 more

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https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018420968742

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Journal: Social Science Information	Publication Date: Nov 18, 2020
Citations: 7	License type: CC BY 4.0

Affiliation: University of Helsinki

Abstract

Discussions of the relations between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences have proliferated in recent years. Our article contributes to the philosophical and methodological foundations of the cognitive social sciences by proposing a framework based on contemporary mechanistic approaches to the philosophy of science to analyze the epistemological, ontological and methodological aspects of research programs at the intersection of the social sciences and the cognitive sciences. We apply this framework to three case studies which address the phenomena of social coordination, transactive memory, and ethnicity. We also assess how successful these research programs have been in providing mechanistic explanations for these phenomena, and where more work remains to be done.

Highlights

Discussions of the relations between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences have proliferated in recent years
Gabe Ignatow (2014) regrets that cognitive sociologists have not been clear about their ontological and epistemological commitments, suggesting that the bridge being built between sociology and the cognitive sciences would be enhanced, if cognitive sociologists would take a stance in philosophy of social science debates, such as those pertaining to realism, naturalism and social constructionism
In our first case study on interpersonal social coordination, we will argue that mechanistic philosophy of science can ground a feasible division of labor between cognitive and social scientists studying the same phenomena by identifying different questions about cognitive and social mechanisms to which they answer

Summary

Introduction

Discussions of the relations between the social sciences and the cognitive sciences have proliferated in recent years. In our first case study on interpersonal social coordination, we will argue that mechanistic philosophy of science can ground a feasible division of labor between cognitive and social scientists studying the same phenomena by identifying different questions about cognitive and social mechanisms (and the environments in which they operate) to which they answer.

Results

Conclusion