О квазифидеизме и рациональности религиозных убеждений

Abstract

According to D. Pritchard’s quasi-fideism, fundamental religious beliefs are Wittgensteinian hinge propositions (beliefs). However, interpretation of the hinge propositions is not unambiguous. For Pritchard, they are «arational visceral commitments». For D. Moyal-Sharrock, they are animal certainties. For A. Coliva, they are rules having propositional content which plays the role of a norm. Our interpretation of hinge propositions is close to that of A. Coliva, except for a few important points. We rather agree with Wittgenstein’s liberal view of hinges. For us they are Wittgensteinian rules (norms) governing language games within a form of life. In the light of our interpretation of hinge propositions we consider the question of the rationality of religious beliefs, analyze Pritchard’s quasi-fideism and the problem of deep disagreements. Deep disagreements are disagreements that are hard to resolve in a rational way. There are different views on their nature. We treat deep disagreements as disagreements that are based on «hinge disagreements», that is, disagreements between incompatible or contradictory hinge beliefs (norms) or beliefs that are playing the hinge role but may not be hinges (if they are false). We argue that deep disagreements can in principle be resolved. Our view avoids relativism. Religious disagreements are usually considered as deep disagreements. We claim that if there is a religious form of life in the sense of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, then there are also religious hinge propositions. Deep disagreements between the theist and the atheist are genuine disagreements in the sense that only one side is right. And there are reasons to believe that they can be rationally resolved.