Abstract
What is the nature of deep disagreement? In this paper, I consider two similar albeit seemingly rival answers to this question: the Wittgensteinian theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over hinge propositions, and the fundamental epistemic principle theory, according to which deep disagreements are disagreements over fundamental epistemic principles. I assess these theories against a set of desiderata for a satisfactory theory of deep disagreement, and argue that while the fundamental epistemic principle theory does better than the Wittgensteinian theory on this score, the fundamental epistemic principle theory nevertheless struggles to explain the variety of deep disagreement.
Highlights
Recent work on deep disagreement has tended to focus on various epistemic issues, such as whether deep disagreements are rationally resolvable, or whether deep disagreement supports epistemic relativism.1 this work has tended to jettison the important metaphysical question of what deep disagreement consists in
Applied to indirect cases of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian theory will tell us that the young Earth creationist Henry and the new atheist Richard indirectly deeply disagree about whether P only if they really do disagree over P, and their disagreement over P commits them—whether logically, probabilistically, or epistemically—to disagreeing over a hinge commitment H, say, that the Earth existed in the distant past
I argued that the fundamental epistemic principle theory faces two challenges
Summary
Recent work on deep disagreement has tended to focus on various epistemic issues, such as whether deep disagreements are rationally resolvable (and if so, how), or whether deep disagreement supports epistemic relativism. this work has tended to jettison the important metaphysical question of what deep disagreement consists in. We might think that we should step back and ask about the nature of deep disagreement directly, for example, by asking what such disagreements consist in and what kinds of attitudes are at stake in such cases. As it stands, we lack any clear criteria for what deep disagreement is which is separate from the epistemological question of whether they are rationally intractable or irresolvable. I argue that the two major theories of deep disagreement in the literature face substantial challenges, challenges which put pressure on the adequacy of these theories I argue, that both theories are prima facie inadequate
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