Эксперименты, Нил Леви и ответственность психопатов

Abstract

The article analyzes the Australian philosopher Neil Levy’s approach to the problem of the moral responsibility of psychopaths; it examines his arguments based on empirical data in favour of reducing or even denying their responsibility, and his use of the case of psychopaths as an argument against proponents of attributionism in general and T. M. Scanlon in particular. It should be noted that the studies Levy cites are isolated and contradictory. The most radical interpretations of the experiments he cites have been subsequently corrected by him, but even the weakest thesis he proposes (that the degree of moral responsibility should be greatly reduced in the case of some of the psychopaths) should, it seems, be rejected primarily on the basis of the inconsistency of the very concept of psychopathy that he uses too recklessly. Using the results of empirical research can help philosophers clarify the phenomenon of moral responsibility, but to do so philosophers should use more accurate experiments and interpret them more thoughtfully and carefully.