Процессуальная самостоятельность следователя: миф или реальность?

Abstract

The reasons that influenced the significant limitation of the procedural independence of the investigator due to a sharp increase in the volume of procedural-administrative and procedural-control powers of the head of the investigative body are identified. One of these reasons is explained by attempts to overcome the consequences of the well-known law enforcement crisis of the 1990s, which led to a decrease in the quality of the preliminary investigation. The second reason is connected with the administrativeization of the Soviet preliminary investigation, with the assignment of classical jurisdictional (judicial-investigative) powers to the executive authorities. As a result, the conclusion is formulated that at present the procedural independence of the investigator is nothing more than another doctrinal myth. Attention is drawn to the fact that discretionary powers in the arsenal of the investigator are actually reduced to a minimum, and the possibility of their use rests on the procedural omnipotence of the head of the investigative body. In conclusion, the prospects for the further development of the preliminary investigation bodies in the context of the subject of this article are analyzed.