중앙선거관리위원회 독립성 강화를 위한 새로운 헌법학적 제안

Abstract

The independence and neutrality of the consensus decision-making body can be achieved through the independence and neutrality of the members constituting it. The National Election Commission is a consensus-based decision-making body composed of nine members, and the independence of the committee comes from the independence and neutrality of nine members.
 Until now, prior research for the independence and neutrality of the National Election Commission has been conducted around discussions on the appointment, election, and nomination of members.
 The researcher suggests that the independence and political neutrality of the National Election Commission is achieved through the independence and political neutrality of the National Election Commission, and that the appointment, election, and nomination of the National Election Commission can make efforts to appoint, elect, and nominate politically neutral figures for the National Assembly's consent.
 The introduction of (super)weighted majority voting in the National Assembly's motion will allow minority political forces to make efforts to appoint, elect, and nominate people with political neutrality as objectively as possible, even for non-dominant denial. The use of the (super) weighted majority of the National Assembly's consent can be applied not only to the National Election Commission but also to the National Assembly's consent process by the Supreme Court justices and constitutional judges. The focus can be on who nominates, not who nominates.
 If a small number of political forces have non-dominant rights, humans who have tried to be politically neutral will appear politically neutral, and their duties will be more politically neutral than they are now, as agreed to by the National Election Commission, a constitutional body that deals with elections and politics. In this way, the committee, which is composed of members passed by majority vote, can play a leading role in revising and redistricting the Democratic Republic of Korea's political interests and public interests in Korean politics, which are conflicting and revolving.
 National Election Commissioners appointed after the National Assembly passed the motion through the decision-making of (ultra)Qualified Majority will have to work full-time, and their strong democratic legitimacy gained through (ultra)Qualified Majority can strengthen the National Election Commission's weapons in the process of revising the Political Law. What is essential for this is a higher level of political neutrality than the political neutrality of the qualifications of constitutional judges.
 Humans cannot always be mechanically neutral and apply different criteria for judgment depending on the case. Everyone has a preconceived notion and prejudice. Therefore, there cannot be a logical National Election Commission member with perfect ‘political neutrality’. Because the National Election Commissioner is human. All we can do to study the Constitution is to systematically devise a way to approach impossible political neutrality. The best way is to check individual political forces through other political forces, and the key is to make it possible to check even if other political forces are a minority.